THE EFFECT OF FINANCIAL PERFORMANCE OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT ON THE PROPORTION OF DISKRESIONER FUND by Taherawan, Habelki Sinaga
1 
 
 
 
THE EFFECT OF FINANCIAL PERFORMANCE OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT ON 
THE PROPORTION OF DISKRESIONER FUND 
Habelki Taherawan Sinaga, Rina Bukit, Tapi Anda Sari Lubis 
sinaga.habelki@gmail.com 
Universitas Sumatera Utara 
 
Abstract:The objective of the research was to analyze the influence of Local 
Financial Performance proxied by Local Dependency Ratio, Intergovernmental 
Revenue, SiLPA’s Financing, and Fiscal Space Ratio with the Status of Regional 
Head as moderating variable on the  Proportion of Discretionary Fund. The 
population was 51 districts/cities of North Sumatera Province that were 
approaching the election of regional heads (Pilkada) from  2010 to 2015, and all 
of them were used as the samples, taken by using saturated sampling technique. 
The data were analyzed by using multiple regression and residual test. The result 
of the research showed that the variables of Local Dependency Ratio, 
Intergovernmental Revenue, SiLPA’s Financing, and Fiscal Space Ratio 
simultaneously had significant influence on the Proportion of Discretionary 
Fund. Partially, the variable of Local Dependency Ratio did not have any 
influence on the Proportion of Discretionary Fund, while the variables of 
Intergovernmental Revenue, SiLPA’s Financing, and Fiscal Space Ratio had 
positive and significant influence on the Proportion of Discretionary Fund. The 
status of Regional Heads could not moderate the influence of the variables of 
Local Dependency Ratio, Intergovernmental Revenue, SiLPA’s Financing, and 
Fiscal Space Ratio on the Proportion of Discretionary Fund. 
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A. INTRODUCTION 
Since 2005, Indonesian citizens who meet the constitutional requirements have the right to 
choose their candidate of regional head in their administrative areas respectively. This  act  is 
taken to anticipating the occurrence of money politics that is common to occur in every moment 
of election of regional heads (Pilkada). But in fact, this mechanism has not been able to create an 
atmosphere of democracy that is clean from deviation. Politic campaign has high cost  that must 
fulfill by candidates, include the cost of gaining party support, the recruitment of thousands of 
volunteers, media and advertising costs, consultants and so on, that can not be fully by each 
personal candidate finances (Mietzner, 2010. Local budgets are be regarded as potential 
resources to the elites in order to build their image and popularity to the voters.This condition 
prompt regional budgets tend to manifest as a representation of the interests of political 
campaigns instead of responsive to the people interest. 
Political motivation to utilize public funds is packed by various policies/programs or 
special aid donations that have a institutes. This way is more secure and not in the category of 
electoral violations. Beneficiaries of this program are prioritized by the loyal voters and swing 
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voters (Simanjuntak, 2012). One of the most widely used in the public budget posts is Grants and 
Social Aid Spending (Sjahrir et al., 2013). 
The total of the discretionary fund during the election time is fluctuating and almost the 
same at each location. The budget tends to rise sharply ahead of the pilkada (T), than reducing  
after the elections (T + 1). discretionary fund in all regency / municipal election contestants in 
North Sumatra Province starting from 2010 to 2015 can illustrate that commonly. 
In 2010 total discretionary fund of district / city participant in regional elections in North 
Sumatra before pilkada (T) reached 873.10 billion rupiah (up 165.52% from the previous year) 
and dropped the following year (T + 1) to 472, 81 billion rupiah (down 45.85%). In 2011 the 
discretionary fund shows different patterns. This year, the total allocation of discretionary fund 
in the elections years (T) is 45.34 billion rupiahs (fell 34.18% from the previous year), and fell 
again in the following year to 35.62 billion rupiahs (down 21.43%). In 2012, discretionary fund 
was identified be used for political purposes, when total of discretionary fund in election years  
(T) reached 13.28 billion rupiah (up 202.88%), but in the following year (T + 1) up to 8.63 
billion rupiah (down by 35.02%). In 2013, total budget of discretionary fund in the years of 
Pilkada (T) increased significantly to 267.31 billion rupiahs (up 145.99%). But the total dropped 
dramatically in the following year (T + 1) to 102.40 billion rupiah (down by 61.69%). Similarly, 
in the 2015 Pilkada implementation, discretionary expenditures near the Pilkada (T) amounted to 
720.58% (up 63.57%), down to 2016 (T + 1) to 329.09 billion rupiahs (down 54, 33%). 
Minister of Home Affairs decree number. 32/2011 jo. Minister of Home Affairs decree 
number 39/2012, article 4 and 22 states that the allocation of grants and Social Aid budgets 
deliberated to regional financial capabilities after prioritizing compulsory expenditure 
fulfillment. In principle, regional financial capability shows the extent to which the region is able 
to optimize its own revenues from its own assets, local taxes, Intergovernmental Revenue 
Transfer, Receiving Financing and so on to meet the needs of spending and government 
activities. In the era of autonomy, regional financial capability is often measured by using 
financial performance of local governments (Kuncoro, 2009).  
Many indicators can be used to measure financial performance of local governments, such 
as Local Dependency Ratio, Intergovernmental Revenue, SiLPA’s Financing, and Fiscal Space 
Ratio. Rochmatullah and Probohudono (2014) proved that Local Own Source Revenue and the 
SiLPA had an effect on the Social Aid Spending Allocation, while the Fiscal balance transfers 
did not affect the Social Aid Spending Allocation. 
Praptiningsih (2014) proves that Local Dependency Ratio separately has a significant 
effect on Social Aid Spending. While the Intergovernmental Revenue and SiLPA variable did 
not significantly affect the Social Aid Spending Plan. Morozumi et al. (2014) showed an increase 
in transfers to the Other Government Unit (OGU), which may contribute to increasing the value 
of spending on 100 countries hosting elections in 1975-2010. Winoto and Falikhatun (2015) 
proved that the factor of Blood Financial Capability (Fiscal Space Ratio) affects the proportion 
of the Discretionary Fund (Grants and Social Aid), while the characteristics of Regional 
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Financial Performance which is proxied with Regional Revenue has an effect on the Proportion 
of Grants and Social Aid Expenditure The SiLPA variable has no influence on the Proportion of 
Grant and Social Aid spending. 
A significant increase in budget spending occurs more frequently, when the incumbent 
decides to re-nominate (Rogoff and Sibert, 1988). This phenomenon often happens in developing 
and new democracies countries while degree of media independency, government transparency, 
and the level of political maturity of society is still low (Klomp and de Haan, 2013; Castro and 
Martins, 2016; and Veiga et al, 2017 ). The increase in public spending is important to increase 
the incumbent popularity of the electorate, so it earned maximum votes. 
Ritonga and Alam (2010) along with Winoto and Falikhatun (2015) proved that the 
proportion of incumbent regional discretionary fund allocations is greater than non-incumbent 
areas. In line with that, Yuwani and Handayani (2011) stated that the Incumbent district financial 
assistance meant to follow the re-election of bigger than the regency/city whose Incumbent did 
not intend to follow the re-election. But contrary to the findings, studies conducted by Tarigan 
(2014), Amalia and Pratolo (2013) have failed to prove a significant difference among  in grants, 
Social Aid and financial assistance spending both in the incumbent and non-incumbent areas in 
the year of election. 
Based on the description in the above , this study aims to test and analyze whether Local 
Dependency Ratio, Intergovernmental Revenue, SiLPA’s Financing, and Fiscal Space Ratio 
have an effect both simultaneously or partially on the proportion of discretionary fund allocation 
in districts / municipalities running Election all of North Sumatera. In addition, this research also 
aims to examine and analyze whether the status of regional heads can moderate the relationship 
between Local Dependency Ratio, Intergovernmental Revenue, SiLPA’s Financing, and Fiscal 
Space Ratio and regional head status with proportion of discretionary fund allocation in 
district/municipal areas Elections throughout North Sumatra. 
From the purpose of this research then submitted two alternative hypothesis that are: 
H1: Local Dependency Ratio, Intergovernmental Revenue, SiLPA’s Financing, and Fiscal 
Space Ratio have an effect both simultaneously or partially on the proportion of 
discretionary fund allocation in districts / municipalities running Election all of North 
Sumatera. 
H2: Status of regional heads can moderate the relationship between Local Dependency Ratio, 
Intergovernmental Revenue, SiLPA’s Financing, and Fiscal Space Ratio and regional head 
status with proportion of discretionary fund allocation in district/municipal areas Elections 
throughout North Sumatra. 
 
B. THEORITICAL REVIEW 
Discretionary Fund 
Discretionary Fund in this study consists of Grants and Social Aid Expenditures. These 
two expenditure items are called discretionary because the amount, allocation to the beneficiary 
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target is determined by the discretionary policy of the regional head, so it tends to be subjective 
(Ritonga and Alam, 2010). In addition, accountability for the utilization of the budget is only 
submitted to to the head of the region, and separate from the accountability of the Regional 
Budget (APBD). 
According to the Minister of Home Affairs Decree Number 32/2011, as amended by 
Home Affairs Decree Number 39/2012, Expenditure shall be the provision of money/goods or 
services from the regional government to other parties based on terms under the laws and 
regulations in order to support the administration of government affairs. While Social Aid is the 
giving of money/goods from local government to individuals, families, groups and/or 
communities that aims to protect against possible social risks. The allocation of these two types 
of spending is non-mandatory, non-binding and sustainable, and selective. 
Referring to the formulas used by Winoto and Falikhatun (2015), The Proportion of 
Discretionary Fund in this study is measured by: 
The Proportion of Discretionary Fund = 
 Total of Grants and Social Aid 
Local Spending 
Financial Performance Of Local Governments 
Regional Financial Performance consists of various financial indicators that describe the 
level of local government financial performance achievement in a fiscal period (Sularso and 
Restianto, 2011). Some Financial Performance ratios that can be used to measure the financial 
Performance of Local Government are: 
Local Dependency Ratio 
Financial ability is a regional effort to explore various local own revenue resources to 
covered government activities (Halim and Kusufi, 2012). Local Dependency Ratio can be 
formulated as follows: 
Local Dependency Ratio = 
Local Own-source Revenue  
Total Of Local Spending 
Intergovernmental Revenue 
Patrick (2007) stated if the Intergovernmental Revenue as a central financing transfer from 
the central government to local governments to funding local operational needs. 
Intergovernmental Revenue Ratios can be formulated as follows: 
Intergovernmental Revenue (IR) = 
 
Total of Fiscal balance transfers from 
the central government to regions 
Total of Local Goverment’s Revenue 
 
SiLPA’s Financing (Sisa Lebih Pembiayaan Anggaran) 
SiLPA is the difference of revenues and expenditures on Net financing components in the 
Regional Government Budget (APBD) (Ardhini and Handayani, 2011). SiLPA reflects the 
efficiency of budget utilization because SiLPA is a form of APBD surplus or if net financing is 
5 
 
 
 
greater than the APBD’s deficit (Hidayat and Maski, 2012: 9). SiLPA’s Financing can be 
measured through: 
 
SiLPA’s Financing = 
SiLPA 
Total of Local Spending  
Fiscal Space Ratio  
Heller (2005) states that the Fiscal Space Ratio is a government effort to provide the 
financial resources that can be used continuous without interfere the balance of the government's 
balance sheet. According to DJPK (2014) Fiscal Space Ratio is calculated by the following 
formula: 
  
Fiscal Space Ratio = 
Fiscal Space  
Total of Local Government’s Revenue 
Status Of Regional Head  
ccording to Article 162 of Law Number 10/2016 on the Second Amendment to Law 
Number 1/2015 Concerning the Stipulation of Government Regulation in Lieu of Law No. 1 of 
2014 on the Elections of Governors, Regents, and Mayors Becoming Laws, that the regional 
head holds a position for holding office for 5 (five) years from the date of inauguration and 
thereafter may be re-elected in the same position for only 1 (one) term of office. The head of the 
region that is re-nominating in the same position is called the incumbent candidate. 
Teori Political Budget Cycle (PBC) 
Competition and political costs of electoral influence the opportunist behavior of 
politicians to manipulate budgetary policies, especially Incumbent. This phenomenon then lead 
the development of the theory of Political Budget Cycle (PBC) at a critical point in the round of 
election time (Harsasto, 2014). 
The PBC scale will look higher in areas where the incumbent decides to run again (Guo, 
2009; Enkelmann and Leibrecht, 2013; Klein and Sakurai, 2015). Competition pressure and the 
political high cost to promote candidates, forcing incumbents to manipulate budgetary policies 
till public funds can be absorbed into the candidate's personal cash (Benito et al., 2012; Balaguer 
et al., 2015). 
 
C. MATERIAL AND METHODS 
Data collecting method 
This research is located in all regencies/cities in North Sumatera Province, while 
population of this study are all districts/cities that engage the election of regional heads starting 
from 2010 s.d. 2015 as many as 51 regions. The entire population is then used as a sample by 
using a saturated sampling technique / census. 
The Author do not include pilkada held at the provincial level into the population for data 
uniformity. Furthermore, 5 (five) districts/cities that engage pilkada in 2010 namely Labuhan 
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Batu Selatan District, Labuhan Batu Utara Regency, West Nias Regency, North Nias Regency 
and Gunung Sitoli City are also not included in the population. The reasons is because in 2010 
they have just divided so that the budget cannot be compared with the budget before the election. 
 Data have collected by documentation of various secondary data that has been published 
by various parties. The data is sourced from the Director General of Treasury and Finance of the 
Ministry of Finance of the Republic of Indonesia, the Director General of Regional Autonomy of 
the Ministry of Home Affairs, and the General Election Commission. 
  
Data analysis method 
This study uses multiple linear regression analysis to prove the first hypothesis. Hypothesis 
test can be done after classical assumption have tested. The regression equation model used to 
prove the first hypothesis is:  
Y =  β0 + β1X1 + β2X2 + β3X3 + β4X4 + ε 
Moreover, this study also used Residual Test to answer the second hypothesis. The 
regression equation can be formulated as follows: 
Z   = β0 + β1X1 + β2X2 + β3X3 + β4X4 + ε ......................................... (1) 
ǀεǀ  =  β0 + β5Y ................................................................................... (2) 
Exp: 
Y =  Proportion of Discretionary Fund 
β0 =  constanta  
X1 = Local Dependency Ratio   
X2 = Intergovernmental Revenue 
X3 = SiLPA’s Financing 
X4 = Fiscal Space Ratio 
β1 – β5 =  regression coefficient  
ε = Error 
ǀεǀ          = Absolute error 
 
RESULTS 
Normality test 
One-Sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov test obtained Asymp value. Sig. (2-tailed)> 0,05 (0,200> 
0,05). It can thus be concluded that the residual data meet the assumption of normality.  
 
Multicollinearity test 
The result showed that the tolerance values of all independent variables> 0.10. Furthermore, the 
VIF value of all independent variables is also <10. This proves that there is no multicollinearity 
problem between independent variables in this study. 
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Heteroscedasticity test 
Based on the Park Test result, with Ttable value 2.011 (df = 47, α = 0,05), the significance value of 
park test results showed that all> 0.05. Thus, it can be concluded that all variance from the 
residual one observation to the other remains fixed (Homoscedasticity). 
Glejser test showed that none of independent variable has significant effect on the dependent 
variable absolute residual value (AbsUt). That is, the regression model has a constant residual 
variant (homoscedasticity). 
 
Autocorrelation 
Autocorrelation tests were conducted to 36 samples from a total of 51 samples on this 
study. This test needs to be done because in this research there are 18 regencies/cities in North 
Sumatera which have been conducting pilkada twice in 2010 s.d. 2015. 
The result showed that there is no positive autocorrelation between independent variables 
where the DW > du (2.066> 1.724). Moreover, the value of (4-d)> du (1.934> 1.724) which 
means there is no negative autocorrelation. Thus, it can be concluded that there is no 
autocorrelation among 18 regencies/cities in North Sumatra that have been conducting pilkada 2 
(two) times in the period 2010 s.d. 2015. 
 
Result Of Fist Hypothesis Tested   
The results of the first hypothesis test are shown as Table 1 below. 
 Table 1 
Ringkasan Hasil Pengujian Hipotesis 
Variable Unstandardized 
coefficients 
Sig 
B 
Constanta -.317 .000 
Rasio Kemampuan Keuangan Daerah (X1) .033 .697 
Intergovernmental Revenue (X2) .181 .028 
Tingkat Pembiayaan SiLPA (X3) .167 .030 
Rasio Ruang Fiskal (X4) .252 .015 
F 7.431 0,000 
R .627a  
Adjusted R2 .340  
Dependent variable : Proporsi Alokasi Belanja Diskresioner (Y) 
Source : Result of research, 2017 (data processed) 
 
Based on the results of the data as presented in table 1 above, furthermore can be 
formulated model of multiple regression equation in this research, that is: 
Y = -0,317 + 0,033X1 + 0,181X2 + 0,167X3 + 0,252X4 
Exp: 
Y = Proportion of Discretionary Fund 
X1 = Local Dependency Ratio 
X2 = Intergovernmental Revenue 
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X3 = SiLPA’s Financing 
X4 = Fiscal Space Ratio 
 
The F value in the table 1 shows the value 0.000, which is smaller than 0.05 (α = 5%). This 
means that simultaneously, Local Dependency Ratio, Intergovernmental Revenue Ratio, SiLPA 
Financing, and Fiscal Space Ratio affect the Proportion of Discretionary Fund  . Meanwhile,  
Adjusted R2 in the table 1 shows the value is 0.340. this means, the ability of independent 
variables is only able to explain the dependent variable by 34%, while the other 66% is explained 
by other variables outside of this study. 
Meanwhile, based on partial test results (T-Test) can be concluded that Local Dependency 
Ratio is not affect the Proportion of  Discretionary Fund  while  Intergovernmental Revenue, 
SiLPA Financing, and Fiscal Space Ratio is affected and significant to Proportion of 
Discretionary Fund. The significance value of the variable in the t test result table above shows 
that the significance value of the variables in the t test result table above shows that except local 
dependency ratio, all significance values < 0.05. 
 
The Second Hypothesis Test 
Residual Test Result obtained after doing linear regression of dependend variable to 
absolute residual value (obtained from multiple linear regression of independent variable to 
moderator variable), can be described through the table below:  
 
Table 2 
Hasil Uji Residual 
Model 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
T Sig. B Std. Error Beta 
1 (Constant) .213 .077  2.772 .009 
Proportion of Discretionary Fund (Y) 1.163 1.024 .191 1.136 .264 
a. Dependent Variable: Moderator 
 
│e│ = 0,213 + 1,163 Y 
Keterangan: 
│e│ =  Absolut Error term 
Y = Proportion of Discretionary Fund  
 
From the result of regression equation above, the coefficient of regression (constant) is 
positive, while the value of model significance (0,264)> 0,05 at significance level α = 5%. Thus, 
it can be concluded that the status of Head of Region cannot moderate (strengthen / weaken) the 
relationship between Local Dependency Ratio (X1), Intergovernmental Revenue (X2), SiLPA’s 
Financing (X3) and Fiscal Space Ratio (X4) to Proportion of Discretionary Fund (H2 accepted, 
H0 rejected). 
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CONCLUSION  
This study shows that simultaneously, Local Dependency Ratio, Intergovernmental 
Revenue, SiLPA’s Financing and Fiscal Space Ratio affect the Proportion of Discretionary Fund. 
Partially, Local Dependency Ratio does not affect the Proportion of Discretionary Fund, while 
the Intergovernmental Revenue, SiLPA Financing and Fiscal Space Ratio affect the Proportion 
of Discretionary Fund. This study also proves that the Head of Regional Status is not able to 
moderate the relationship between the variables of Local Dependency Ratio, Intergovernmental 
Revenue, SiLPA Financing and Fiscal Space Ratio affect the Proportion of Discretionary Fund. 
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